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INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Jones
v. City of Los Angeles that a city ordinance criminalizing sitting, lying, or
sleeping on public streets and sidewalks—in all places and at all times—
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.1 The court recognized that people must sit, lie, and sleep at some
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1
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1131–38 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d
1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
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point each day.2 The court concluded that a 24/7 ban against sitting, lying,
and sleeping in public areas violates the rights of homeless persons when
other alternatives are unavailable because individuals in such unfortunate
circumstances are unable to entirely avoid engaging in those innocent
activities.3
The Ninth Circuit later vacated Jones after the parties settled, and Los
Angeles agreed that its ordinance would not be enforced during nighttime
hours.4 Jones was nonetheless subsequently utilized by lower courts as
guidance when analyzing ordinances targeted at subsistence activities
regularly performed by homeless persons in public places.5 The United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) argued in 2015 that Jones provides the
appropriate legal framework for analyzing Eighth Amendment claims.6 It
asserted that half a million people are likely to experience homelessness on
any given night.7 The DOJ further reported, based upon an annual homeless
assessment report generated by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, that 42% of homeless persons slept in unsheltered public
locations in 2014.8 The DOJ maintained that the logic of Jones “remains
instructive and persuasive,”9 and it took the position “that criminalizing
sleeping in public when no shelter is available violates the Eighth
Amendment by criminalizing status.”10
The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed its adherence to the Jones
framework in Martin v. City of Boise.11 The appellate panel in Martin
Id. at 1136; see also In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“Sleep
is a physiological need, not an option for humans.”).
3
Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136–37.
4
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Jones v. City of Los
Angeles, 555 F. App’x. 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the court vacated and
withdrew its opinion in Jones "only after the parties entered a settlement agreement
suspending the nighttime enforcement" of the Los Angeles ordinance).
5
E.g., Cobine v. City of Eureka, 250 F. Supp. 3d 423, 431 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Bell v. City of
Boise, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1107 (D. Idaho 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 709 F.3d 890
(9th Cir. 2013); State v. Adams, 91 So. 3d 724, 745–54 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010); contra,
e.g., Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1231–34 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(choosing to adopt the reasoning of the dissent in Jones rather than its majority's rationale).
6
Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, 10, 16, Bell v. Boise 834 F. Supp. 2d 1103
(D. Idaho 2011) (No. 1:09-cv-540-REB).
7
Id. at 2.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 10.
10
Id. at 9–10.
11
Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1035–36, 1046 (9th Cir. 2018).
2
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recognized the Jones decision was not binding but wrote that it agreed “with
Jones’s reasoning and central conclusion.”12 The panel held “that an
ordinance violates the Eighth Amendment insofar as it imposes criminal
sanctions against homeless individuals for sleeping outdoors, on public
property, when no alternative shelter is available to them.”13 It explained:
Like the Jones panel, “we in no way dictate to the City that it
must provide sufficient shelter for the homeless, or allow
anyone who wishes to sit, lie, or sleep on the streets . . . at any
time and at any place.” We hold only that “so long as there is
a greater number of homeless individuals in [a jurisdiction]
than the number of available beds [in shelters],” the
jurisdiction cannot prosecute homeless individuals for
“involuntarily sitting, lying, and sleeping in public.” That is,
as long as there is no option of sleeping indoors, the
government cannot criminalize indigent, homeless people for
sleeping outdoors, on public property, on the false premise
they had a choice in the matter.14
This Article examines the extent to which the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment protects the ability of
homeless persons to subsist in public places. It reviews the origins and history
of the clause and how it has been applied to test the constitutionality of local
laws targeted at the homeless. It further discusses whether homelessness
constitutes a recognizable status protected by the Eighth Amendment, and, if
so, whether protection is extended to unavoidable conduct resulting from that
status. Lastly, this Article examines the circumstances under which
subsistence activities performed in public by homeless persons may be
considered unavoidable and thereby protected by the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause against criminalization.

12

Id. at 1035.
Id.
14
Id. at 1048 (citations omitted) (quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118,
1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007)).
13
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS
CLAUSE.
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is derived from a 1689
act of the British Parliament.15 The Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”16 That
act adopted a bill of rights in response to abuses committed during the reign
of James II.17 Among other enumerated rights, the 1689 act declared “that
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.”18 The 1776 Virginia Declaration of
Rights adopted an identical provision.19 “The Eighth Amendment was based
directly on Art. I, § 9, of the Virginia Declaration of Rights . . . .”20
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was originally believed
to be directed at prohibiting certain methods of punishment.21 The General
Court of Virginia explained with respect to the provision contained in the
Virginia Declaration of Rights that it “was never designed to control the
Legislative right to determine ad libitum [at pleasure] upon the adequacy of
punishment, but is merely applicable to the modes of punishment.”22 The
United States Supreme Court similarly concluded in the case of In re
Kemmler that the punishment of crime is almost wholly confided in the
legislative branch of government, and the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment operates as a limitation upon the types of punishment

15

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 750 (Hilliard,
Gray, and Company, 1833).
16
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
17
See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 130 (Philip H. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829) (1825); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ch. 29, at 723 (WM. Hardcastle ed.
1892)(1769); Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 852–60 (1969).
18
An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of
the Crown 1689 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 41, 43 (1971) (modernizing the spelling of terms
contained in England’s Official Bill of Rights).
19
See VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. I, § 9.
20
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 n.10 (1983).
21
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169–70 (1976); Granucci, supra note 17, at 839–42.
22
Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 447, 449–50 (Gen. Ct. 1824).
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that may be imposed.23 “So that, if the punishment prescribed for an offence
. . . were manifestly cruel and unusual as burning at the stake, crucifixion[,]
breaking on the wheel, or the like, it would be the duty of the courts to
adjudge such penalties to be within the constitutional prohibition.”24
The Supreme Court began to broaden its view of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause at the end of the 19th century. The majority in
O’Neil v. Vermont rejected a challenge to a conditional sentence of 19,914
days imprisonment imposed for unlawful sale of liquor on the basis that
federal error had not been assigned, and because the Eighth Amendment was
not at that time applied to the states.25 Justice Field wrote in dissent that this
sentence of more than 54 years seemed unusual and cruel in its severity when
considering the offenses for which it was imposed.26 He reasoned that the
inhibition against cruel and unusual punishment is not only directed against
atrocious punishments like the rack, thumbscrew, and iron boot, “but against
all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly
disproportioned to the offences charged.”27 Writing for himself and Justice
Brewer, the first Justice Harlan agreed that confinement for “54 years and
204 days, inflicts punishment, which, in view of the character of the offences
committed, must be deemed cruel and unusual.”28
Justice Field’s position in O’Neil later became the prevailing view in
Weems v. United States, where the Supreme Court struck a criminal sentence
by measuring the disproportionality of punishment against the crime
charged.29 The Court acknowledged the origins of the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments, but it explained that “a principle, to be vital,
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”30
It expanded the scope of the prohibition beyond methods of punishment,

23

In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446–47 (1890).
Id. at 446; see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 329–30 (Little, Brown and Company 3d ed., 1874).
25
O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331–32 (1892).
26
Id. at 338–41, 364–65 (Field, J., dissenting).
27
Id. at 339–40.
28
Id. at 371 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380–81 (1910). Weems applied a prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments found in the Philippine bill of rights, which the
Court explained “was taken from the Constitution of the United States, and must have the
same meaning.” Id. at 367.
30
Id. at 373.
24
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rhetorically asking, “[w]ith power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to
give criminal character to the actions of men, with power unlimited to fix
terms of imprisonment with what accompaniments they might, what more
potent instrument of cruelty could be put into the hands of power?”31 It thus
held that, although the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause arose from the
experience of certain evils, its general language should not “be necessarily
confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken.”32
The Court proceeded to compare the sentence in that case to sentences
that might be handed out for similar and more serious crimes.33 It found that
the disproportionality of the penalty established for the crime at issue in
Weems (when contrasted against other penalties) showed more than
“different exercises of legislative judgment,” and, instead, exhibited the
“difference between unrestrained power and that which is exercised under the
spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish justice.”34 By requiring
comparative proportionality, the Weems Court concluded that “[t]he purpose
of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not
tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the
reformation of the criminal.”35
Justice Edward White dissented in Weems because logical future
application of the majority’s expansion of the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment beyond methods of punishment to “the degree of severity
with which authorized modes of punishment may be inflicted” could
completely divest the legislative branch of government of its legitimate
independent power to define and punish crime.36 The dissent complained that
statements made by the majority imposing a legislative duty to shape
legislation with a view to reform and punish a criminal conferred power upon
courts to refuse to enforce laws defining and punishing crimes if they are not,
in a court’s opinion, properly motivated.37
Justice White opined that the ban against cruel punishment forbids
criminal penalties that inflict “unnecessary bodily suffering through a resort

31

Id. at 372–73.
Id. at 373.
33
Id. at 381.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 388 (White, J., dissenting); see also id. at 397–98, 410–11.
37
Id. at 386–88.
32
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to inhuman methods for causing bodily torture . . . .”38 He further wrote that
the proscription of unusual punishment forbids courts from inflicting lawful
modes of punishment in an unusual manner and legislatures from conferring
such power to the courts.39 Justice White disputed the majority’s assertion
that the vitality of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause could be
ensured only by expanding its scope beyond methods of punishment.40 He
agreed that the clause is not limited to historically decried practices and,
instead, “being generic, embraces all methods within its intendment.”41
Therefore, “if it could be conceived that to-morrow the lawmaking power,
instead of providing for the infliction of the death penalty by hanging, should
command its infliction by burying alive, who could doubt that the law would
be repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against cruel punishment?”42 In
his view this did not, however, warrant expanding “the judicial power by
endowing it with a vast authority to control the legislative department in the
exercise of its discretion to define and punish crime.”43
Many decades after deciding Weems, the Supreme Court again
expanded the reach of the Eighth Amendment in Robinson v. California.44
Robinson struck a statute that had been construed as criminalizing a person’s
“status” or “chronic condition” of being a drug addict.45 The Court
recognized that a state might validly regulate by imposing criminal sanctions
“against the unauthorized manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or
possession of narcotics within its borders.”46 It further noted that a state could
establish compulsory treatment programs for addicts that might require
periods of involuntary confinement and penal sanctions for failure to comply
with such programs.47 However, the Court categorized drug addiction among
other illnesses48 and opined that “a law which made a criminal offense of
such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of

38

Id. at 409.
Id. at 409–10.
40
Id. at 410–11.
41
Id. at 410.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 411.
44
See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
45
Id. at 665–67.
46
Id. at 664.
47
Id. at 664–65.
48
Id. at 666–67.
39

8

CRIMINALLY HOMELESS?

Vol. 4

cruel and unusual punishment . . . .”49 It concluded that “[e]ven one day in
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a
common cold.”50
Justice Byron White dissented, writing that he deemed the majority’s
“application of ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ so novel” that he suspected
“the Court was hard put to find a way to ascribe to the Framers of the
Constitution the result reached today rather than to its own notions of ordered
liberty.”51 He wrote that he might have other thoughts if a conviction rested
upon sheer status.52 However, Justice White maintained that someone could
not be convicted of being an addict without proof of regular use of narcotics
and opined that a state possesses the power to punish such use.53 Justice Clark
wrote in dissent that “[i]t is no answer to suggest that we are dealing with an
involuntary status and thus penal sanctions will be ineffective and unfair.”54
He asserted that a state should not be powerless to deter persons who
purchase, possess, and use narcotics from becoming addicts.55 Justice Clark
noted that the majority recognized the authority of a state to punish the actions
by which addicts became addicted and opined that such resulting volitional
addiction should be treated no differently.56 In addition, he wrote that
“‘status’ offenses have long been known and recognized in the criminal
law.”57
The Supreme Court later discussed Robinson at length in Powell v.
Texas, but it could not reach a majority opinion upon how to apply it. 58 A
plurality upheld the conviction of a person for being intoxicated in a public
place.59 Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for himself and three other justices
that Robinson did not apply because the statute at issue did not seek to punish
mere status.60 It instead imposed “a criminal sanction for public behavior
49

Id. at 666.
Id. at 667.
51
Id. at 689 (White, J., dissenting).
52
Id. at 685.
53
Id. at 686–88.
54
Id. at 684 (Clark, J., dissenting).
55
Id. at 683.
56
Id. at 683–84.
57
Id. at 684 (Clark, J., dissenting); see generally Forrest W. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other
Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1203 (1953).
58
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
59
See id. at 516–37 (Marshall, J.); Id. at 537–48 (Black, J., concurring); Id. at 548–54
(White, J., concurring in result).
60
Id. at 532–534 (Marshall, J.).
50
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which may create substantial health and safety hazards, both for appellant
and for members of the general public, and which offends the moral and
esthetic sensibilities of a large segment of the community.”61 He further
commented that “unless Robinson is so viewed it is difficult to see any
limiting principle that would serve to prevent this Court from becoming,
under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the ultimate
arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility, in diverse areas of criminal
law, throughout the country.”62
Justice Fortas took a different view and wrote in dissent for himself
and three other justices that Robinson stands on a principle that “[c]riminal
penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is
powerless to change.”63 He noted that the statute at issue in Powell differed
from the one at issue in Robinson since it punished a condition coupled with
an act: being intoxicated and being found in such condition in a public
place.64 In other words, “[t]he statute covers more than a mere status.”65
However, the dissent found this difference immaterial, asserting that “the
essential constitutional defect here is the same as in Robinson, for in both
cases the particular defendant was accused of being in a condition which he
had no capacity to change or avoid.”66
The Marshall plurality in Powell found the dissent’s interpretation of
Robinson troubling because it would extend the Eighth Amendment to
establish a “constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility.”67 It asserted
that the dissent’s logic would have no limitation.68 It insisted the same logic
that excuses a chronic alcoholic from criminal responsibility for involuntary
conduct caused by that disease could be used to excuse a murderer afflicted
with a compulsion to kill.69 The Marshall plurality wrote that “as the dissent
acknowledges, there is a substantial definitional distinction between a
‘status,’ as in Robinson, and a ‘condition,’ which is said to be involved in this
case.”70 It argued that the dissent’s interpretation would convert Robinson
61

Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
63
Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 567–68.
67
Id. at 534 (Marshall, J.).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 533.
62
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into a national standard for personal accountability that is contrary to
traditional common law concepts and considerations of federalism.71
Justice Byron White disagreed with both the Marshall plurality and
the dissent’s apparent preoccupation with labels.72 He wrote that a chronic
alcoholic should not be shielded by a compulsion to drink if he or she
knowingly fails to take precautions while sober against committing an act
that has been criminalized.73 He also recognized, however, that some
alcoholics do not have homes and “[f]or all practical purposes the public
streets may be home for these unfortunates . . . .”74 Justice White posited that
“[t]his is more a function of economic station than of disease, although the
disease may lead to destitution and perpetuate that condition.”75 He
concluded that a statute punishing public drunkenness “is in effect a law
which bans the single act for which they may not be convicted under the
Eighth Amendment—the act of getting drunk.”76 He nonetheless concurred
in the judgment affirming the conviction in Powell because the defendant
“made no showing that he was unable to stay off the streets on the night in
question.”77
The Supreme Court summarized its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
in Ingraham v. Wright.78 The Ingraham Court wrote that the framers of the
Constitution “feared the imposition of torture and other cruel punishments
not only by judges acting beyond their lawful authority, but also by
legislatures engaged in making the laws by which judicial authority would be
measured.”79 The Court reviewed earlier decisions upon whether a
punishment is “cruel and unusual” and explained:
[T]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause circumscribes
the criminal process in three ways: First, it limits the kinds of
punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes;
second, it proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime; and third, it imposes substantive
limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such. We
71

Id. at 535–37.
Id. at 550, n.2 (White, J., concurring in result).
73
Id. at 550.
74
Id. at 551.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 554.
78
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664–67 (1977).
79
Id. at 665.
72

2019

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

11

have recognized the last limitation as one to be applied
sparingly.80
The third category mentioned in Ingraham originates from Robinson.81
The Ninth Circuit explained in Jones v. City of Los Angeles that the
third protection enumerated in Ingraham “differs from the first two in that it
limits what the state can criminalize, not how it can punish.”82 It held that
Robinson, at a minimum, “establishes that the state may not criminalize
‘being’; that is, the state may not punish a person for who he is, independent
of anything he has done.”83 A majority in Jones discerned from the Fortas
dissent and the White concurrence that a majority of the Supreme Court in
Powell read Robinson as supporting the proposition the “state cannot punish
a person for certain conditions, either arising from his own acts or contracted
involuntarily, or acts that he is powerless to avoid.”84 The Jones court
concluded from those principles that a city cannot “expressly criminalize the
status of homelessness by making it a crime to be homeless without violating
the Eight Amendment, nor can it criminalize acts that are an integral aspect
of that status.”85
The Jones majority wrote that “Justice White and the Powell
dissenters shared a common view of the importance of involuntariness to
Eighth Amendment inquiry.”86 It posited that Justice White’s disagreement
upon the meaning of Robinson deprived the Marshall plurality’s opinion of
precedential value beyond the precise facts in Powell.87 The Jones majority
recognized that Justice White and the Powell dissenters also did not fully
agree, and it agreed with Justice White to the extent that his views differed
from those of the dissenters.88 However, it found any disagreement between
80

Id. at 667 (citations omitted); see also Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1045 (9th
Cir. 2018); but see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (Scalia, J.)
(concluding for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist that “the Eighth Amendment contains
no proportionality guarantee”).
81
See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667 (citing Robinson, 370 U.S. 660).
82
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d
1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
83
Id. at 1133.
84
Id.; see also id. at 1135 (adopting an interpretation of Robinson upon which it
determined that the dissenters and Justice White would agree in Powell).
85
Id. at 1132.
86
Id. at 1134.
87
Id. at 1135.
88
Id. (“We agree with Justice White that analysis of the Eighth Amendment’s substantive
limits on criminalization ‘is not advanced by preoccupation with the label “condition”’.”);
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Justice White and the Powell dissenters immaterial writing that,
notwithstanding their differences, “five Justices in Powell understood
Robinson to stand for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the state from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is the
unavoidable consequence of one’s status or being.”89 The Jones majority
asserted, based upon its reading of the opinions of Justice White and the
dissenters in Powell, that there are two considerations that are relevant with
respect to the limit placed upon the state’s power to criminalize by the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause.90 “The first is the distinction between pure
status—the state of being—and pure conduct—the act of doing. The second
is the distinction between an involuntary act or condition and a voluntary
one.”91
The Jones court found that Los Angeles did not have sufficient shelter
space to house all of its homeless.92 Many homeless, therefore, had no place
to be other than on city sidewalks.93 It asserted that “[w]hether sitting, lying,
and sleeping are defined as acts or conditions, they are universal and
unavoidable consequences of being human.”94 The Jones court further
explained that human beings cannot remain in a state of perpetual motion and
must sit, lie, and sleep at some time during the day or night. 95 It therefore
concluded that “by criminalizing sitting, lying, and sleeping, the City is in
fact criminalizing [the] status [of] homeless individuals.”96
The United States District Court for the District of Idaho in Bell v.
City of Boise summarized its understanding of the majority holding in Jones
as follows:
First, the Court must determine whether the homeless have no
choice but to be present in the City’s public spaces. This could
be established either on the basis that there is insufficient
shelter space or perhaps because, for at least a portion of the
homeless population, the ‘‘chronic homeless,’’ living in a
see also id. at 1136 (stating that the Jones majority was guided by an admonition made by
Justice White in Powell).
89
Id. at 1135; see also Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2018).
90
Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 1122–23.
93
Id. at 1123.
94
Id. at 1136.
95
See id. at 1136–37.
96
Id. at 1137.
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shelter is not a viable option. Second, the Court must find that
[the] enforcement of [a prohibition] effectively penalizes the
homeless for simply being present or engaging in innocent
activity, such as sleeping, that does not warrant punishment
under the Eighth Amendment and, in effect, criminalizes the
status of being homeless.97
Circuit Judge Rymer dissented in Jones, writing that “[n]either the
Supreme Court nor any other circuit court of appeals has ever held that
conduct derivative of a status may not be criminalized.”98 She asserted that
the majority improperly assembled the individual opinions in Powell into a
result that not even the dissent would have reached.99 Judge Rymer explained
that Powell dissenters said only that conduct closely related to status may not
be punished if “the conduct is ‘a characteristic and involuntary part of the
pattern of the [status] as it afflicts’ the particular individual. This is not the
case with a homeless person who sometimes has shelter and sometimes
doesn’t.”100 She further explained that no federal appellate court had until
then “intimated (let alone held) that status plus a condition which exists on
account of discretionary action by someone else is the kind of ‘involuntary’
condition that cannot be criminalized.”101 Judge Rymer warned that the
decision of the Jones majority would, in effect, “immunize from criminal
liability those who commit an act as a result of a condition that the
government’s failure to provide a benefit has left them in.”102
Judge Rymer additionally criticized the Jones majority for accepting
general facts about the status of homeless persons that Justice White’s
concurrence in Powell would have insisted be specifically proven.103 She
asserted that the Jones majority, without proof, assumed the condition of the
persons who challenged the ordinance at issue.104 In summary, Judge Rymer
complained that the Jones majority synthesized the concurring and dissent
Bell v. City of Boise, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1108 (D. Idaho 2011), rev’d on other
grounds, 709 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Cobine v. City of Eureka, 250 F. Supp. 3d
423, 431 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
98
Jones, 444 F.3d at 1139 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
99
Id.
100
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 559 n.2 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
dissenting)).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Jones, 444 F.3d at 1146–47 (Rymer, J., dissenting); see generally Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 552–54 (1967) (White, J., concurring in result).
104
Jones, 444 F.3d at 1147 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
97
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opinions in Powell into a broad proposition expressly endorsed by neither,105
all while ignoring that Ingraham subsequently reconfirmed the Marshall
plurality’s determination in Powell that the Robinson principle has limited
application.106
Judge Rymer noted that Ingraham referred to the Marshall plurality’s
interpretation of Robinson in Powell when stating that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause should be “applied sparingly” when limiting legislative
authority to define crimes.107 She wrote that it should be applied only in rare
cases involving “an internal affliction, potentially an innocent or involuntary
one.”108 She explained that homelessness in not an innate or immutable
characteristic and is instead a transitory state into which some people fall and
others opt.109 Judge Rymer wrote that “Robinson does not apply to
criminalization of conduct.”110 Judge Rymer further wrote that it only applies
to situations where a law makes a person continuously guilty of a crime
without having actually done something where the offense was supposedly
committed.111 She therefore reasoned that Robinson does not apply to the act
of sleeping, sitting, or lying on a city street.112
II. IS HOMELESSNESS A RECOGNIZABLE STATUS?
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California held in Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco that
homelessness is not a status.113 The court in Joyce wrote that “[d]epicting
homelessness as ‘status’ is by no means self-evident . . . .”114 It explained that
homelessness cannot be readily classified as a status.115 The court
acknowledged that the concept of status is difficult to define, but it wrote that
“certain factors assist in its determination, such as the involuntariness of the
acquisition of that quality (including the presence or not of that characteristic
at birth), and the degree to which an individual has control over that
105
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See id. at 1139, 1144, 1149.
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characteristic.”116 The court in Joyce identified age, race, gender, national
origin, and illness as examples that demonstrate the characteristics of
status.117 It noted that the Robinson Court recognized drug addiction as a
status by analogizing it to an illness or disease that might be involuntarily
contracted.118 It did not, however, find homelessness directly analogous to a
disease.119 The court explained:
While homelessness can be thrust upon an unwitting recipient,
and while a person may be largely incapable of changing that
condition, the distinction between the ability to eliminate one's
drug addiction as compared to one's homelessness is a
distinction in kind as much as in degree. To argue that
homelessness is a status and not a condition, moreover, is to
deny the efficacy of acts of social intervention to change the
condition of those currently homeless.120
In the view of the court in Joyce, “status cannot be defined as a function of
the discretionary acts of others.”121
The California Supreme Court endorsed, but did not expressly adopt,
the Joyce analysis in Tobe v. City of Santa Ana.122 It refused to recognize
homelessness as a status because the declarations submitted in that case by
persons claiming to be homeless were “far from clear that none had
alternatives to either the condition of being homeless or the conduct that led
to homelessness . . . .”123 The California Court of Appeals subsequently
explained in Allen v. City of Sacramento that “being homeless is not
necessarily equivalent to an involuntary condition or status.”124 The Allen
court noted that “no generalization can describe a diverse population,” and it
rejected status claims because the homeless persons in that case alleged only
that they had no shelter available but did not allege why they had no shelter.125
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The Jones majority disagreed with the analysis in Joyce.126 In its
view, the involuntariness of the act or condition criminalized “is the critical
factor delineating a constitutionally cognizable status, and incidental conduct
which is integral to and an unavoidable result of that status, from acts or
conditions that can be criminalized consistent with the Eighth
Amendment.”127 The Jones majority largely skirted discussing whether
homelessness qualifies as a status and instead focused upon the distinction
between voluntary and involuntary acts and conditions.128 It found that single
factor determinative.129 Without separately analyzing what constitutes status,
the Jones majority concluded that homelessness is a status, writing that
homeless individuals “are in a chronic state that may have been acquired
‘innocently or involuntarily.’”130
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
similarly ruled in Pottinger v. City of Miami that “voluntariness of [a] status
or condition is the decisive factor.”131 Based on the testimony of a number
of expert witnesses, the court in Pottinger found that homeless persons
“rarely choose to be homeless.”132 It recounted testimony that homeless
persons share the characteristic of being socially isolated and having no one
to take them in.133 The court also noted that experts identified many causes
for homelessness, and that those causes are often exacerbated by factors that
result from that homelessness.134 In summary, the court in Pottinger
concluded that people “become homeless due to a variety of factors that are
beyond their control,”135 and they do not choose to live under the conditions
126
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127
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attendant to homelessness, except in rare cases.136
Cases employing reasoning similar to Pottinger integrate the question
of status into a more generalized inquiry into “being.”137 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas opined in Johnson v. City of
Dallas that the distinction drawn in Joyce between status and acts does not
appear to flow logically from Robinson.138 The court explained that “[i]t
should be a foregone conclusion that maintaining human life requires certain
acts, among them being the consuming of nourishment, breathing and
sleeping.”139 It explained that many homeless persons have no choice but to
perform those acts in public.140 The court in Johnson therefore concluded that
prohibitions against performing those life sustaining activities in public
impermissibly punish status because “the status of being could clearly not be
criminalized under Robinson.”141
In Anderson v. City of Portland, the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon departed from the reasoning of the Jones majority and
Pottinger that voluntariness is the decisive factor in determining status. 142 It
explained that the nature of the prohibited conduct is an equally important
factor.143 It noted that both the Marshall plurality in Powell and Judge
Rymer’s dissent in Jones looked at the nature of a prohibited act to see if it
involved something that created a substantial health or safety hazard or other
conduct that society has an interest in preventing.144 The court in Anderson,
therefore, concluded that Eighth Amendment analysis focuses upon whether
an enactment criminalizes something that is both “involuntary and
innocent.”145
136
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Joyce and the Jones majority approach the issue of status from
opposite directions. Joyce treats the existence of status as a question that
must be resolved first before addressing whether a prohibition penalizes
status or conduct.146 The Jones majority instead starts with the penalized
activity to determine whether it was voluntary and concludes that status has
been unconstitutionally punished if the activity was unavoidable.147 The
White concurrence and the dissent in Powell both find the issue of
voluntariness important.148 However, nothing in Powell suggests that a
majority of the justices would have skipped the threshold question of
status.149
The Marshall plurality in Powell would not extend Robinson to cover
conduct committed as a result of a condition,150 but it also would not assume
status was at issue and roundly criticized the trial court’s finding that
alcoholism is a disease, writing “the inescapable fact is that there is no
agreement among members of the medical profession about what it means to
say that ‘alcoholism’ is a ‘disease.’”151 The dissent disagreed but nonetheless
found that “consideration of the Eighth Amendment issue in this case requires
an understanding of ‘the disease of chronic alcoholism’ . . . .”152 Having found
alcoholism to be a disease causing symptomatic compulsion that destroyed
the affected person’s will power, the dissent concluded that the Eighth
Amendment does not allow punishment of an alcoholic for a condition that
person can no longer control.153 Both the Marshall plurality and the dissent
place considerable emphasis upon the threshold question of status and
whether alcoholism constitutes a disease.154
146
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Justice White’s analysis in Powell also does not appear to eliminate
the threshold question of status.155 He opined that a person who claims he has
been unconstitutionally punished for being a chronic alcoholic must both
prove his disease and that the alcoholism created the compulsion to engage
in the activity for which he has been penalized.156 Justice White wrote in
Powell that Robinson dealt with the “‘status’ of narcotics addiction” which
meant “a condition brought about by acts remote in time from the application
of the criminal sanctions contemplated, a condition which was relatively
permanent in duration, and a condition of great magnitude and significance
in terms of human behavior and values.”157 He further explained that chronic
alcoholism was the same, but the mere transitory state of being drunk was
not.158 In contrast to chronic alcoholism, the condition of being merely drunk
is (1) not far removed from the acts that caused the intoxication, (2) not a
state of great duration, and (3) an isolated instance that has relatively slight
importance in the life of the intoxicated person.159
A.

Supreme Court Guidance Upon Status.

It is unclear whether the Supreme Court would recognize
homelessness as a status. Neither Robinson, nor the Marshall plurality, nor
the dissent in Powell provided an analytical framework for determining when
something constitutes status, but it is noteworthy that all focused on whether
the condition at issue was an illness or disease.160 Robinson addressed drug
addiction.161 Powell involved alcoholism.162 It could therefore be maintained
that the Robinson principle is limited to those types of settings involving
ingrained human characteristics and internal afflictions.163
Justice White’s definition of status could encompass more than just
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infirmities and ailments164 and might include chronic homelessness. Justice
White expressly mentioned economic factors as a relevant consideration.165
Justice Douglas later wrote (with citation to Robinson) in his dissent from the
Supreme Court’s dismissal of certiorari in Hicks v. District of Columbia that
he did “not see how economic or social status can be made a crime any more
than being a drug addict can be.”166 Under Justice White’s formulation in
Powell, homelessness could be a status if it (1) has a cause remote in time
from its condition, (2) is relatively permanent in duration, and (3) has great
magnitude and significance in terms of human behavior and values.167
Satisfaction of each factor may be reasonably debated, but chronic
homelessness would seem to qualify in most instances. A person does not
suddenly become chronically homeless. It is usually caused by a variety of
economic, physical, and psychological factors having distant origins.168
Homelessness also perpetuates itself because it creates barriers that make it
hard to escape once someone becomes homeless.169 Thus, by the time it
becomes chronic, homelessness may have attained a relatively permanent
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duration.170 Homelessness arguably has great magnitude and significance in
terms of human behavior and values because those who experience it suffer
from unsafe and unsanitary living conditions that few would choose.171
III. DOES THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE PROTECT
CONDUCT DERIVED FROM STATUS?
In Lehr v. City of Sacramento, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California rejected the reasoning of the Jones majority that
the Eighth Amendment extends protection to involuntary acts occasioned by
status.172 It expressed concern that extension of the Jones majority’s
reasoning “would potentially provide constitutional recourse to anyone
convicted on the basis of conduct derivative of a condition he is allegedly
‘powerless to change.’”173 For example, “[a] wide variety of sex offenders
would be immune from punishment if they could show that their conduct was
not voluntary but part of the pattern of a disease.”174 It explained that such
reasoning would, in effect, establish a constitutional doctrine of criminal
responsibility.175 The court in Lehr warned that constitutionalizing the
involuntariness principle would require a court “to couch its own moral
beliefs in constitutional terms and to substitute its own judgment as to the
morality of the criminal law for that of the states.”176
The court acknowledged in Lehr that homelessness is a serious
problem.177 It nonetheless found slippery slope concerns too great to hold that
conduct derivative of status may not be criminalized.178 The court opined that
it would be “dangerous bordering on irresponsible” to address the plight of
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homelessness by constitutionalizing an involuntariness principle because of
its potential ramifications across the entire field of criminal law.179
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California in Ashbaucher v. City of Arcata similarly declined to adopt the
reasoning of the Jones majority.180 It wrote that “[t]his issue whether the
Eighth Amendment protects the homeless against laws that prohibit conduct
that is impossible for a homeless person to avoid was not, however, presented
in Powell and has not been decided by the Supreme Court.”181 It reasoned
that the Marshall plurality in Powell expressly rejected the expansive
conclusion reached by the Jones majority that the Robinson principle extends
to conduct.182 In that court’s view, Powell “did not set forth a constitutional
rule that involuntary conduct cannot be criminalized under Robinson . . . .”183
The court questioned the validity of the involuntariness principle cobbled
together by the Jones majority from the Fortas dissent and White concurrence
in Powell.184 It instead asserted that only Powell did not foreclose the
possibility “that an individual could challenge a statute punishing conduct
that was compelled by a disease or otherwise involuntary under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause if he could make a greater showing of
compulsion or involuntariness of the prohibited conduct than was shown in
Powell.”185 However, it shared the concerns expressed in Joyce about “the
ramifications of providing constitutional protection to any condition over
which a showing could be made that the defendant had no control.”186 The
court in Ashbaucher ultimately agreed with the holding in Lehr that Robinson
and Powell did not extend the protection of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause to involuntary conduct derived from status.187
The outright rejection of Jones by lower courts in Lehr and
Ashbaucher is no longer tenable in that circuit with the reaffirmation of Jones
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Martin v. City of Boise.188 However,
179
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Martin leaves many questions unanswered.189 The Martin panel wrote that its
“holding is a narrow one.”190 It purports not to “suggest that a jurisdiction
with insufficient shelter can never criminalize the act of sleeping outside.”191
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon wrote in
Anderson v. City of Portland that it understood the slippery slope concerns
expressed in Lehr, and that court’s reluctance to extend blanket constitutional
protection to involuntary acts derived from status.192 The court in Anderson
nonetheless concluded that “it seems a reasonable proposition under the
Eighth Amendment that homeless persons should not be subject to criminal
prosecution for merely sleeping in public at any time of day.” 193 It further
explained that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against criminalizing
status extends to involuntary conduct that does not threaten public health,
safety, or welfare.194 The court wrote that the critical factor is whether, and
to what degree, an ordinance “criminalizes ‘conduct that society has an
interest in preventing.’”195 The Oregon District Court indicated in a
subsequent Anderson ruling that public safety and sanitation may be
sufficient governmental interests to support prohibitions against particular
activities.196
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
took an approach in Johnson v. City of Dallas which is similar to the one
taken in Anderson.197 The court in Johnson held that homeless persons cannot
be prevented from performing certain life sustaining acts in public, such as
eating, breathing, and sleeping, if they have nowhere else to go.198 However,
it drew a distinction between innocent acts and those that a community has
an interest in protecting against.199 Therefore, while the court acknowledged
189
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that homeless persons must consume nourishment, it nonetheless held that a
city may prohibit individuals from rummaging through trash receptacles for
food.200 The court in Johnson recognized that a line must be drawn
somewhere because there should not be a “class of persons who are
constitutionally immune from much of the criminal law.”201
It is uncertain where a line would be drawn if the Supreme Court
extends Eighth Amendment protection to involuntary conduct derived from
status. The court in Lehr opined that only minimal innocent activity like
sitting, lying, or sleeping would be protected under the analysis of the Jones
majority, and those activities could be criminalized when coupled with some
sort of conduct like camping or obstructing pedestrian or vehicular traffic.202
The United States District Court of the District of Idaho made a similar
observation in Bell v. City of Boise that there is a difference between a
“complete ban on innocent acts, such as sitting, lying, or sleeping in a public
way at any time of day, and other ordinances that are directed toward conduct
beyond merely being present in public places.”203 The Jones majority
indicated that ordinances can avoid criminalizing status by “making an
element of the crime some conduct in combination with sitting, lying, or
sleeping in a state of homelessness.”204 It then proceeded to list examples that
would ostensibly pass muster: (1) ordinances that prohibit standing or lying
in a public way when it obstructs pedestrian or vehicle traffic, (2) ordinances
that prohibit camping on any public property or right of way, (3) ordinances
with safe harbor provisions that limit hours of enforcement and thereby
provide times that homeless persons may sit, lie, or sleep, and (4) ordinances
that prohibit sitting or lying in only certain designated zones.205
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon rejected a
challenge to an anti-camping ordinance in O’Callaghan v. City of
Portland.206 The court in O’Callaghan noted the Jones majority mentioned
200
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Portland’s anti-camping ordinance as one that added a conduct element
sufficient to survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny.207 The court wrote that
such mention suggested that the Ninth Circuit would sustain the
constitutionality of an anti-camping ordinance.208 The court in O’Callaghan
also agreed with the court’s conclusion in Anderson that an ordinance
prohibiting derivative conduct does not punish status if the prohibition is
based on legitimate governmental interests of safety and sanitation.209
It is, however, unclear whether the Ninth Circuit would agree with the
Oregon District Court’s reading of Jones. The district court denied a motion
in O’Callaghan to declare Portland’s anti-camping ordinance facially
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.210 Days after deciding Martin
v. City of Boise, the Ninth Circuit reversed that ruling and directed the district
court to allow Mr. O’Callaghan to amend his complaint to include facts
asserting an “as applied” challenge to the ordinance.211 The Ninth Circuit
noted in an unpublished memorandum ruling that it had “recently held that a
city ordinance prohibiting individuals from sleeping outside on public
property may violate the Eighth Amendment when enforced against homeless
individuals who have no access to alternative shelter.”212 It therefore appears
that the Ninth Circuit may reject the notion that the conduct of homeless
camping falls outside the purview of Jones and Martin.
The court in Martin agreed with the Jones majority “that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or
condition if it is the unavoidable consequence of one’s status or being.”213
Like the Jones majority, the Martin panel recognized that some restrictions
could survive constitutional scrutiny, writing: “Even where shelter is
unavailable, an ordinance prohibiting sitting, lying, or sleeping outside at
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particular times or in particular locations might well be constitutionally
permissible. So, too, might an ordinance barring the obstruction of public
rights of way or the erection of certain structures.”214 The examples of things
that might be permissible in Jones and Martin are not particularly helpful by
themselves because they are not definitive. The Martin panel gave additional
guidance, however, beyond listing examples. It explained: “Whether some
other ordinance is consistent with the Eighth Amendment will depend, as
here, on whether it punishes a person for lacking the means to live out the
‘universal and unavoidable consequences of being human’ in the way the
ordinance prescribes.”215
The Supreme Court has not given clear guidance. The Marshall
plurality in Powell drew a clear line between behavior and status.216 Justice
Black added in concurrence on behalf of himself and the second Justice
Harlan that Robinson explicitly refused to allow use of status, or a condition,
as protection against criminal culpability for actual behavior. 217 The dissent
countered that Powell did not deal with responsibility for criminal acts and
instead dealt with culpability for a mere condition.218 Justice White did not
find preoccupation with labels to be fruitful.219 He would not condone
punishing a chronic alcoholic for yielding to an irresistible urge that he could
no longer control.220 In Justice White’s view, however, a person who has a
condition can sometimes still be punished without violating the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.221 He opined that a person can be punished for
his or her condition if “volitional acts brought about the ‘condition’” and
“those acts are sufficiently proximate to the ‘condition’ for it to be
permissible to impose penal sanctions on the ‘condition.’”222 In other words,
a narcotics addict could be punished for that addiction if it was the result of
recent voluntary use of narcotics.223 In addition, a person suffering from a
condition may nonetheless be punished for acts that could have been avoided
214
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despite the condition.224 Justice White explained, “I cannot say that the
chronic alcoholic who proves his disease and a compulsion to drink is
shielded from conviction when he has knowingly failed to take feasible
precautions against committing a criminal act . . . .”225 Any effort to
reassemble these disparate opinions into a majority view entails a strained
exercise.226
The Eighth Amendment may be the wrong platform upon which to
build constitutional protection for conduct. Its protection of status dates back
only to Robinson and lacks any significant historical development upon
which to base a limiting principle.227 Until Weems, the Supreme Court
addressed the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause only to methods of
punishment.228 There are good arguments that extension of Robinson to acts
derived from status opens a Pandora’s box of unwanted applications that
might excuse abhorrent conduct allegedly attributable to an uncontrollable
compulsion caused by an illness or disease.229 This does not, however, mean
that state and local governments should be or are allowed to punish innocent
conduct.
The second Justice Harlan disagreed with the majority’s application
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in Robinson, but he
nonetheless concurred on the basis that the statute in question, as construed,
constituted “an arbitrary imposition which exceeds the power that a State may
exercise in enacting its criminal law.”230 Justice Harlan’s view merits
additional consideration. The United States Supreme Court has long
recognized that “[t]he police power is subject to the constitutional limitation
that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably.”231 Those limitations
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may provide a better analytical foundation for protection of innocent conduct.
The Washington State Supreme Court explained in City of Seattle v. Pullman
that an ordinance which makes no distinction between harmful conduct and
essentially innocent conduct is an unreasonable exercise of police power.232
The New York Court of Appeals in Fenster v. Leary characterized
vagrancy as a status crime and recognized that a statute could not stand under
Robinson if it made criminal a condition over which an accused has no
control, but it held that the conditions of vagrancy did not appear to directly
involve the constitutional problem encountered in Robinson.233 The court,
nonetheless, invalidated a vagrancy law as an improper exercise of police
power because it was obvious that:
The only persons arrested and prosecuted as common-law
vagrants are alcoholic derelicts and other unfortunates, whose
only crime, if any, is against themselves, and whose main
offense usually consists in their leaving the environs of skid
row and disturbing by their presence the sensibilities of
residents of nicer parts of the community . . . .234
The Fenster court further explained:
[A] statute whose effect is to curtail the liberty of individuals
to live their lives as they would and whose justification is
claimed to lie in the exercise of the police power of the State
must bear a reasonable relationship to, some proportion to, the
alleged public good on account of which this restriction on
individual liberty would be justified.235
The court concluded that there was no reasonable relationship between public
good and punishment of vagrants, and that the vagrancy law constituted:
[A]n overreaching of the proper limitations of the police
power in that it unreasonably makes criminal and provides
punishment for conduct (if we can call idleness conduct) of an
individual which in no way impinges on the rights or interests
of others and which has in no way been demonstrated to have
anything more than the most tenuous connection with
(1926) (“[P]olice statutes may only be declared unconstitutional where they are arbitrary or
unreasonable attempts to exercise the authority vested in it in the public interest.”).
232
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prevention of crime and preservation of the public order . . .236
The courts in Johnson v. City of Dallas and Anderson v. City of
Portland supplemented their inquiry into questions of status with
considerations traditionally addressed under the auspices of whether an
exercise of police power was reasonable.237 Each court expressed concern
that inquiry solely into the involuntariness of prohibited conduct was
insufficient.238 As the court in Johnson recognized, “[i]f one’s homeless
status entitled one to evade prosecution for removing waste from trash
receptacles in order to find something to eat or wear, it is not difficult to
rationalize constitutional protection for stealing food or clothing.”239 The
addition of traditional police power considerations to Eighth Amendment
analysis was necessitated by extension of the Robinson principle to protect
conduct.240 When considering the admonition in Ingraham that the Robinson
principle should be applied sparingly, it is conceivable that the Supreme
Court might ultimately opt against extending Robinson to acts derived from
status and instead leave questions regarding the scope of constitutional
protection afforded conduct to traditional police power analysis.241
IV. WHEN ARE PUBLIC SUBSISTENCE ACTIVITIES UNAVOIDABLE?
The extension of the Robinson principle to involuntary acts derived
from status raises issues regarding whether particular conduct is avoidable.242
236

See Fenster, 229 N.E.2d at 428; accord Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201,
205–07 (Mass. 1967).
237
Compare Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 349–50 (N.D. Tex. 1994)
(distinguishing between innocent acts and conduct that a community has an interest in
protecting against), rev’d in part, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995), and vacated in part, 61 F.3d
442 (5th Cir. 1995), and Anderson v. City of Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL
2386056, at *7 (D. Or. Jul. 31, 2009) (looking to see whether a prohibition involved a
substantial health or safety hazard or other conduct that society has an interest in
preventing), with Fenster, 229 N.E.2d at 428–30 (examining whether the exercise of police
power has a reasonable relationship to protection of public good).
238
See Anderson, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *7 (concluding that the nature of
prohibited conduct is an equally important consideration to involuntariness); Johnson v.
City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 349–50 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (explaining that a person’s
needs arising from homeless status should not immunize him or her from criminal laws that
prohibit activities that society has an interest in protecting against), rev’d in part, 61 F.3d
442 (5th Cir. 1995), and vacated in part, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995).
239
Johnson, 860 F. Supp. at 350.
240
See Anderson, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *5–7; Johnson, 860 F.Supp. at
346–50.
241
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666–68 (1977).
242
See Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1048 n.8 (9th Cir. 2018).

30

CRIMINALLY HOMELESS?

Vol. 4

The Ninth Circuit wrote in Martin v. City of Boise that “[n]aturally, our
holding does not cover individuals who do have access to adequate temporary
shelter, whether because they have the means to pay for it or because it is
realistically available to them for free, but who choose not to use it.”243 It did
not, however, enunciate a standard by which it may be determined whether
an individual has means to pay for shelter or has chosen not to use available
shelter.244
The Eleventh Circuit in Joel v. City of Orlando rejected an Eighth
Amendment challenge to an anti-camping ordinance because other
alternatives were available to homeless persons.245 The court explained that
Pottinger and Johnson both explicitly relied upon lack of shelter space when
determining that prohibitions against sleeping in public unconstitutionally
punished involuntary conduct.246 It therefore found the reasoning of those
cases distinguishable in instances where alternative shelter is available.247
The Joel court wrote that the availability of shelter space provides an
opportunity for homeless persons to comply with a ban against camping in
public places, and such a prohibition, therefore, does not criminalize
involuntary behavior or punish status.248
The Idaho District Court in Bell v. City of Boise similarly held that an
anti-camping ordinance does not criminalize homelessness if viable shelter
options are available.249 In that case, the court determined that city parks
provided an adequate safe harbor where homeless persons could sit, lie down,
and sleep during the day.250 It further held that a city directive to suspend
enforcement of the ordinance at night when shelter space was unavailable
reasonably ensured that homeless persons were not being punished for
status.251 The adequacy of the safe harbors identified in Bell are, however,
questionable in light of Martin v. City of Boise.252 The Martin panel
commented upon and disapproved of Boise’s enforcement of its anti-camping
243
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ordinance against persons who slept in city parks with rudimentary
precautions to protect themselves against the elements.253 It was also critical
of Boise’s enforcement suspension policies because the panel determined that
enforcement action was taken against individuals when shelter space may
have been generally available but was functionally unavailable to them.254
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California emphasized in Cobine v. City of Eureka that the majority in Jones
determined the homeless individuals in that case had no choice but to be
present on public streets and sidewalks because the number of homeless
persons vastly outnumbered the amount of shelter beds and low income
housing available in Los Angeles.255 It found such unavailability
determinative of whether someone was voluntarily in a public space.256 Thus,
the court concluded that an anti-camping ordinance would not be found to
criminalize involuntary conduct resulting from homelessness if there is
available and adequate shelter space.257 It further explained in Drake v.
County of Sonoma:
There is a strong argument that the Eighth Amendment (and
perhaps also the Due Process Clause) precludes the
government from enforcing an anti-camping ordinance
against homeless people when it has no shelter available for
them. Moreover, the common assumption that it's enough for
the government simply to make temporary shelter beds
available is likely wrong. Even if shelter beds are available,
the ability of the government to take enforcement action
against homeless people who are camping should depend on
the adequacy of conditions in the shelters. This is a particular
concern for people with disabilities, who sometimes struggle
to see their needs met in temporary shelters. And after all,
many homeless people have disabilities.258
Decisions have focused upon whether shelter space is available.259
253
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However, general availability of shelter space may not constitute access to
adequate temporary shelter. The panel in Martin found that shelter’s religious
requirements and stay duration limitations functionally limited access, and in
such situations made no viable shelter available.260 The court in Drake noted
that a shelter may be inadequate to meet the needs of a disabled homeless
person.261 The court in Anderson indicated that an Eighth Amendment claim
may be stated if “homeless people cannot access shelters based on physical
disabilities, mental illness, or other factors.”262 The courts in Bell and Cobine
each adopted a two-part inquiry: (1) is there sufficient shelter space?; and (2)
is the available space a viable option?263 Therefore, the question of whether
certain activities are involuntary or unavoidable may require a case-by-case
individualized determination.264
CONCLUSION
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment has three components: (1) it limits the types of punishments that
can be imposed; (2) it prohibits punishments that are grossly disproportionate
to the severity of the crime committed; and (3) it imposes substantive limits
on what can be made a crime.265 The Supreme Court recognized in Robinson
v. California that this third component of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause prevents punishment on the basis of status.266 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held in Jones v. City of Los Angeles that the prohibition against
status crimes protects homeless persons from being punished for acts that
they are powerless to avoid.267 It therefore concluded that a local ban against
sitting, lying, and sleeping in public areas violates the rights of homeless
persons when other alternatives are unavailable because they cannot avoid
engaging in such activities.268 The precedential value of Jones became
260
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uncertain when the Ninth Circuit later vacated Jones after the parties settled.
However, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to Jones in Martin v.
City of Boise.269
Some courts have expressed skepticism about whether homelessness
constitutes a status.270 It is, however, hard to see how drug addiction could be
considered a status, as it was in Robinson, but homelessness would not.271
Under the analytical framework provided by Justice White in Powell v.
Texas, homelessness would constitute a status if (1) it has a cause remote
from its condition, (2) its duration is relatively permanent, and (3) it has great
magnitude and significance in terms of human behavior and values.272
Chronic homelessness would seem to qualify because it is usually caused by
a variety of remote factors, it is difficult to escape, and it forces those who
suffer it to live in conditions few would choose.273
The Ninth Circuit held in Jones and Martin that a city cannot
criminalize unavoidable acts that are an integral part of a person’s homeless
status.274 If the Robinson principle is extended by the Supreme Court to
protect involuntary acts, questions arise regarding when conduct will be
considered constitutionally unavoidable.275 Jones, Martin, and other cases
have emphasized the lack of other options when ruling that involuntary acts
derived from homeless status may not be criminalized.276 The Eleventh
Circuit rejected a challenge to an anti-camping ordinance in Joel v. City of
Orlando because homeless persons had other available options.277 However,
269
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a generally available option may be inadequate if it is functionally
unavailable to a particular homeless person.278 The question may be two-fold:
(1) are other options available?; and (2) are those options viable for the
homeless person whose acts are at issue?279
The Supreme Court may ultimately decide that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause does not immunize actions of homeless persons from
being criminalized. The Marshall plurality in Powell warned that extension
of Robinson to conduct would create an unbounded principle with negative
repercussions across the field of criminal law.280 Other courts have expressed
similar concerns.281 Some courts have attempted to address such concerns
by adding a requirement that conduct must be both involuntary and innocent
before it is entitled to Eighth Amendment protection.282 This supplementation
is clearly needed to avoid potentially catastrophic over-application of the
Robinson principle,283 but constitutional limitations upon the exercise of
police power already protect innocent conduct from being criminalized.284
Extension of the Robinson principle to conduct may, therefore, be
unnecessary and ultimately undesired by the Supreme Court in light of its
admonition in Ingraham v. Wright that the Robinson principle should be
sparingly applied.285 However, the Ninth Circuit holds, and the DOJ has
agreed, that substantive limits imposed by the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause prevent imposition of criminal penalties
278
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against homeless persons for engaging in subsistence activities in public
when other adequate options are unavailable to them.286
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